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Releasing the 1040, Not so EZ
Constitutional Ambiguities Raised by State
Laws Mandating Tax Return Release for
Presidential Candidates
by MATTHEW M. RYAN*
I. Introduction
In 2016, then-presidential candidate Donald Trump refused to publicly
release his tax returns.1 Troubled by this decision, state lawmakers in at least
twenty-five states proposed legislation requiring disclosure of a presidential
candidate’s tax returns.2 These laws (“release laws”) according to a
sponsoring legislator, allow “statehouses to take th[e] matter into their own
hands and ensure that their voters have the information they need to make a
decision as important as casting a vote for President of the United States.”3
An opponent of such efforts dismissed the laws as “sour grapes over the
election.”4

* Law clerk in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; J.D. 2017, Harvard
Law School. All ideas, opinions, and mistakes in this paper are solely my own. I owe much
gratitude to Professor Laurence Tribe, Max Schulman, and Kripa Sreepada for their invaluable
guidance and to the editors of the Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly for their input and
support.
1. Andrew Buncombe, Donald Trump Refuses to Release Tax Returns – The First Candidate
to do so Since 1976, THE INDEPENDENT (May 11, 2016), https://www.independent.co.uk/news
/world/americas/us-elections/donald-trump-refuses-to-release-his-tax-returns-the-first-candidatenot-to-do-so-since-1976-a7025076.html.
2. Kira Lerner, More Than Half of States are Trying to Force Trump to Release His Tax
Returns, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 6, 2017, 8:39 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/state-legislationtrump-taxes-bd00db338546; see also Alexi McCammond, The Big Picture: The State Efforts to
Keep Trump off the 2020 Ballot, AXIOS (June 24, 2018), https://www.axios.com/states-tax-returnlaws-presidential-2020-trump-88e84cce-7214-409d-b4c7-a24aad919bdb.html.
3. Fenit Nirappil, Blue-State Lawmakers Want to Keep Trump Off 2020 Ballot Unless He
Releases Tax Returns, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2017/01/03/blue-state-lawmakers-want-to-keep-trump-off-2020-ballot-unless-he-relea
ses-tax-returns/.
4. Id.
[19]
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For three years subsequent to President Trump’s decision, no state had
passed a release law. In New Jersey, former Governor Chris Christie vetoed
a bill, calling it a “transparent political stunt.”5 Similarly, in California,
former Governor Jerry Brown vetoed a law, citing constitutional concerns.6
During this time, the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives Ways
and Means Committee sought the tax returns through its statutory power, an
effort now being litigated.7
On July 30, 2019, however, California became the first state to pass a
release law.8 Governor Gavin Newsom argued it promotes his state’s “strong
interest in ensuring that its voters make informed, educated choices in the
voting booth.”9
Challenges to California’s law have swiftly moved to court.10 Many
commentators have offered their opinion on the constitutionality of release
laws,11 and a few law review articles have examined the

5. Alexi McCammond, The Big Picture: The State Efforts to Keep Trump Off the 2020
Ballot, AXIOS (June 24, 2018), https://www.axios.com/states-tax-return-laws-presidential-2020trump-88e84cce-7214-409d-b4c7-a24aad919bdb.html.
6. Id.
7. See Comm. on Ways and Means, U.S. H.R. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., 19-cv-1974 (D.D.C.
July 2, 2019) (The House Committee on Ways and Means filed a lawsuit on July 2, 2019, seeking
the President’s tax returns.).
8. Governor Gavin Newsom Signs SB 27: Tax Transparency Bill, STATE OF CALIFORNIA
(July 30, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/07/30/governor-gavin-newsom-signs-sb-27-tax-tra
nsparency-bill/.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., Jerry Griffin v. Alex Padilla, 19-cv-1477 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2019). On
September 19, 2019, District Judge Morrison England Jr. temporarily enjoined the California law.
See John Myers, Federal Judge Blocks California Law to Force Disclosure of Trump’s Tax
Returns, LA TIMES (Sept. 19, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2019-09-19/trumptax-returns-federal-court-challenge-california.
11. See, e.g., Vikram D. Amar, Can and Should States Mandate Tax Return Disclosure as a
Condition for Presidential Candidates to Appear on the Ballot, JUSTIA: VERDICT (Dec. 30, 2016),
https://verdict.justia.com/2016/12/30/can-states-mandate-tax-return-disclosure-condition-preside
ntial-candidates-appear-ballot; Danielle Lang, States Can Require Financial Disclosure by
Presidential Candidates to Safeguard Electoral Transparency, TAKE CARE (Apr. 6, 2017), https://
takecareblog.com/blog/states-can-require-financial-disclosure-by-presidential-candidates-to-safeg
uard-electoral-transparency; Derek T. Muller, Don’t Use the Ballot to Get Trump’s Tax Returns,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/03/opinion/dont-use-the-ballot-toget-trumps-tax-returns.html; Laurence H. Tribe, et al., Candidates Who Won’t Disclose Taxes
Shouldn’t Be On The Ballot, CNN (Apr. 14, 2017, 5:21 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/14/
opinions/state-laws-requiring-tax-return-disclosure-legal-tribe-painter-eisen/index.html; Governor
Gavin Newsom Signs SB 27: Tax Transparency Bill, CALIFORNIA GOVERNOR (July 31, 2019),
https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/07/30/governor-gavin-newsom-signs-sb-27-tax-transparency-bill/
(Erwin Chemerinsky, Theodore J. Boutrous, Jr., and David Boies providing statements in support
of California law’s constitutionality).
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topic. But no paper has gone beyond analyzing whether the release laws
are constitutional, and instead considered how release laws offer a chance to
clarify consequential ambiguities in the Constitution. This Article does just
that.
More interesting than the political tussle surrounding President
Trump’s decision to release his tax returns, release laws implicate
significant—and complex—constitutional issues, including the definition of
“qualification” Supreme Court case law, the right of privacy, the
Emoluments Clauses, and the extent of state power in choosing the President.
This Article reviews federal precedent to more clearly define what
constitutes a qualification for political office. It then explores the First and
Fourteenth Amendments’ protections for a candidate running for office, and
the corresponding need to balance the burdens of and justifications for a
release law. A release law raises privacy concerns unclearly settled by prior
case law regarding the right to privacy, and it promotes novel justifications
for states to curb presidential corruption, including implicating the
Emoluments Clauses. This Article concludes by investigating the state’s
heightened role as a gatekeeper to the presidency and exploring the role of
states as a last resort to resolve conflicts of interest.
A. The Proposed State Laws
California’s release law and other states’ proposed laws differ in certain
respects. For clarity, this Article assumes a hypothetical release law that
requires a presidential candidate to release her tax returns from the preceding
five years to the respective state’s election agency.13 If a candidate does not
have to complete a tax return under federal law because her income does not
meet the prescribed threshold, then she is not required to release her

12. See Eric T. Tollar, Playing the Trump Card: The Perils of Encroachment Resulting from
Ballot Restrictions, 51 SUFFOLK. U. L. REV. 695 (2018) (arguing release laws are unconstitutional);
see also Danielle Lang, Candidate Disclosure and Ballot Access Bills: Novel Questions on Voting
and Disclosure, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 46 (2017) (addressing Term Limits’ impact on release
laws, conducting the Celebrezze balancing test, providing suggestions for drafting the release law,
and concluding a release law is constitutional); see also Daniel J. Hemel, Can New York Publish
President Trump’s State Tax Returns?, 127 YALE L.J. 62 (2017) (examining whether New York
could require release of President Trump’s state tax returns). As of September 9, 2019, Derek T.
Muller appears to have a forthcoming article arguing the release laws are unconstitutional titled
“Weaponizing the Ballot.” See Derek T. Muller, Weaponizing the Ballot (Abstract), SSRN (Sept.
9, 2019), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3450649.
13. See, e.g., Brad Hoylman, Hoylman Forces NY State Senate Vote on Trump’s Taxes, N.Y.
STATE SENATE (Mar. 10, 2017), https://www.nysenate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/brad-hoylma
n/hoylman-forces-ny-state-senate-vote-trumps-taxes.
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returns.
If the candidate’s income does meet the threshold, then the
election agency posts the returns publicly months before the general election,
but redacts the candidate’s address and Social Security number.15 If a
candidate does not comply, her name is not placed on the state’s presidential
ballot for the general election.16
B. What Information Tax Returns Reveal
Tax returns provide important information.17
Unlike financial
disclosures, which presidential candidates must now complete,18 tax returns
show foreign business activity and assets with losses.19 The returns also
provide exact financial figures, rather than approximate ranges.20
Proponents of release laws argue that tax returns are more thoroughly
14. See, e.g., Presidential Primary Elections: Ballot Access: Hearing on S. 149 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 2017 Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. (Cal. 2017) (report from Sen. Mike McGuire,
Chairman, S. Governance & Fin. Comm.).
15. See, e.g., S. 149, 2017–2018 Leg. (Cal. 2017), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/bill
NavClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB149.
16. See, e.g., Bill Would Bar Presidential Candidates From Appearing on Mass. Ballot
Unless They Release Tax Returns, WBUR (Dec. 13, 2016, 2:12 PM), http://www.wbur.org/poli
ticker/2016/12/13/barrett-tax-returns-legislation. Notably, the California law prohibits placement
on the primary election ballot. See Presidential Tax Transparency and Accountability Act, S. 27,
2018-2019 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?
bill_id=201920200SB27.
17. See, e.g., Carly Fiorina, 2013 Form 1040, TAXNOTES, https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.
taxnotes.com/2019/C_Fiorina_2013.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2019); see also Mitt Romney, 2011
Form 1040, TAXNOTES, https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.taxnotes.com/2019/M_Romney_2011.pdf
(last visited Aug. 30, 2019). The title of this paper is not intended to imply that candidates are
only required to provide Form 1040; tax returns released will likely constitute much more than
Form 1040.
18. 5 U.S.C.A. App. 4 § 101 (2006).
19. Norman Eisen & Richard W. Painter, What Trump’s Tax Returns Could Tell Us About
His Dealings with Russia, POLITICO (Oct. 31, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazi
ne/story/2016/10/donald-trump-taxes-russia-214405; see also Carly Fiorina, 2013 Form 1040,
TAXNOTES 41 (last visited Aug. 30, 2019), https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.taxnotes.com/2019/
C_Fiorina_2013.pdf (showing passive investments in the Netherlands). Some experts argue the
returns reveal very little. Jim Zarroli & Joel Rose, What Trump’s Taxes Would Not Show About
His Finances, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 18, 2017, 4:32 PM), http://www.npr.org/2017/04/18/
524569221/what-trumps-taxes-would-not-show-about-his-finances.
20. On disclosures, the ranges can be quite broad. For instance, in 2012, Mitt Romney’s IRA
was valued between $21 million and $102 million. See William D. Cohan, Mitt Romney Is Worth
$250 Million. Why so Little?, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/opinions/mitt-romney-is-worth-250-million-why-so-little/2012/10/05/64128882-0c20-11e2a310-2363842b7057_story.html. The ranges also have caps, which means very large amounts may
not be fully captured. See Pamela Engel, TRUMP: My Financial Disclosure ‘Is The Largest in the
History of the FEC,’ BUS. INSIDER (May 17, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/trumpfinancial-disclosure-fec-2016-5 (Trump campaign stating that “[t]his report was not designed for a
man of Mr. Trump’s massive wealth. For instance, they have boxes once a certain number is
reached that simply state $50 million or more. Many of these boxes have been checked.”).
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reviewed by the Internal Revenue Service than disclosure forms by the
Federal Election Commission, so filers report their taxes more accurately.21
But lying on either type of form carries significant penalties.22 Furthermore,
tax returns covering a number of years—as required by the release laws—
provide a more historical picture compared to disclosure forms, which reflect
a snapshot in time—often, one or two preceding calendar years.23
Currently, tax returns cannot be disclosed except in limited
circumstances.24 Under 26 U.S.C. § 6103, state employees are prohibited
from disclosing returns “in any manner.”25 The United States Secretary of
the Treasury may only disclose the returns if the taxpayer consents to such
disclosure.26 Illicit release results in significant criminal penalties.27
II. The Background Case Law:
U.S. Term Limits, Incorporated v. Thornton
U.S. Term Limits, Incorporated v. Thornton is the marquee case for
analyzing the legality of a release law.28 In 1992, Arkansas amended its state
constitution to prohibit from its ballot United States House of
Representatives members who had served three terms and Senators who had
served two terms.29 Such candidates could still win via write-in candidacy.30
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 split, found Arkansas’ law unconstitutional.31
Prior to Term Limits, in Powell v. McCormack, the Court established
that the Constitution prohibited Congress from adding qualifications to its
members beyond those enumerated in the Constitution’s Qualifications
21. Presidential Primary Elections: Ballot Access: Hearing on S. 149 Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 2017 Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. (Cal. 2017) (report from Sen. Mike McGuire,
Chairman, S. Governance & Fin. Comm.).
22. Compare 5 C.F.R. § 2634.701 (2019) with 26 U.S.C. § 7207 (2002).
23. Norman Eisen & Richard W. Painter, What Trump’s Tax Returns Could Tell Us About
His Dealings with Russia, POLITICO (Oct. 31, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/
2016/10/donald-trump-taxes-russia-214405.
24. See 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103.
25. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(a)(2) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-53); see also Church of Scientology
v. IRS, 484 U.S. 9, 10 (1987).
26. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(c) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-53). A few other exceptions are
provided for in the statute: see 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(d) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-53) (allowing
release for state tax enforcement); 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(h)(2) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-53)
(allowing release for criminal law purposes).
27. 26 U.S.C.A. § 7213 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-53) (“Any violation of this paragraph
shall be a felony punishable by a fine in any amount not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment of not
more than 5 years, or both, together with the costs of prosecution.”).
28. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
29. Id. at 784.
30. Id. at 828.
31. Id. at 838.
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Clauses.
Powell arose from the House’s refusal to sit a duly-elected
member because he allegedly misused House funds in a prior term.33
Term Limits expanded to the states Powell’s prohibition against
Congress. Like in Powell, the Court found that the Framers intended to keep
elections open to all candidates in order to increase democratic
participation.34 Unlike in Powell—because state power was now at issue—
the Court examined whether states had the “reserved” power under the Tenth
Amendment to add qualifications to obtaining public office.35 This debate—
occurring in 1995—was particularly important given the “Federalism
Revolution,”36 and the perceived need for the Court to draw lines permitting
states broad power while ensuring national stability.37
The Term Limits Court contentiously debated the states’ reserved
power.38 Justice Stevens’s Majority Opinion and Justice Thomas’s
Dissenting Opinion provided thorough historical analysis to bolster their
claims. The Majority presented many Federalist Paper quotes,39 while the
Dissent countered with post-ratification state laws.40 In addition to wrestling

32. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548 (1969); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2
(“No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of Twenty-five Years,
and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an
Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.”); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (“No Person
Shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a
Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for
which he shall be chosen.”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen,
or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible
to the Office of President; neither shall any person be eligible to that Office who shall not have
attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United
States.”).
33. Powell, 395 U.S. at 490.
34. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 779, 793–95 (1995) (citing Powell, 395 U.S. at 540–41).
35. Id. at 798.
36. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Federalism Revolution, 31 N.M. L. REV. 7
(2001).
37. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109
HARV. L. REV. 78, 79–80 (1995) (“Term Limits elicited a confrontation among the Justices over
the basic structural principles of the federal union . . . .”); Leon Lazer, The Term Limits Case, 12
TOURO L. REV. 373, 386 (1995) (quoting Professor Laurence H. Tribe saying, “[i]f the
Constitution’s failure to nail down a given matter with absolute finality becomes an excuse for the
states to adopt measures that will be upheld by the Supreme Court regardless of how much they
may undermine the integrity of the nation, then the ability of the country to hold together in difficult
times may be seriously endangered”).
38. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109
HARV. L. REV. 78, 80 (1995) (observing that the Majority and the Dissent battled to a draw over
textual interpretation and historical context).
39. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 806–08 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NOS. 52, 57 (James
Madison)).
40. Id. at 905–10 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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over the Constitution’s history, both sides scuffled over its text. For the
Majority, the Constitution’s enumeration of three congressional
qualifications in the Qualifications Clauses was ample evidence that the
Framers created an exhaustive list.41 For the Dissent, those three
qualifications were simply a baseline that could be further expanded upon if
a state chose to do so.42
Likely sensing that the Originalist and Textualist solutions provided no
clear answer, the Majority bolstered its position with two structural
considerations. First, the Court looked to the fact that the people voted to
elect their congressperson—“a fundamental principle of our representative
democracy” that states could not obstruct.43 Second, the Court cautioned
that state-mandated qualifications would lead to a “patchwork of state
qualifications,” and undermine Congress’s purpose to represent all people.44
III. What is a Qualification?
Term Limits established that a state cannot add qualifications for
members of Congress beyond those enumerated in the United States
Constitution. Yet, the Opinion did little to define a qualification. To be fair,
a comprehensive definition of “qualification” is difficult to formulate
because the Constitution contains an inherent tension. The Elections Clauses
permit some state regulation of federal elections. For instance, states, in
Article I of the Constitution, can regulate “the times, places, and manners”
for congressional elections, and in Article II of the Constitution, states may
regulate the “manner” of selecting their electors for the Electoral College.45
Thus, a state can regulate the “manner” of choosing its officeholders,46 but it
cannot add a qualification to the office.47 In wrestling with this tension, the
Court has avoided comprehensive definitions and, instead, approached
interpretation of state laws on a case-by-case basis. As Justice Neil Gorsuch

41. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 805.
42. Id. at 867 (“[T]hese different formulations—whether negative or affirmative—merely
establish minimum qualifications.”).
43. Id. at 819–22.
44. Id. at 822.
45. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of Chusing
Senators.”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be
appointed an Elector.”).
46. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
47. See generally Term Limits, 514 U.S. 779; see generally Powell, 395 U.S. 486.
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observed in a law review article advocating for congressional term limits
prior to Term Limits, the Court “knows a qualification or manner regulation
when it sees one.”48
Term Limits provided two guideposts for defining a qualification. It is
an obligation: (1) targeting a “class of candidates,”49 or (2) impermissibly
“handicapping”50 or “barring”51 a candidate. These standards offer no clear
resolution for a release law.
A. A Class of Candidates: “Inherent” Qualities Targeted
Term Limits’ reference to targeting a “class” of candidates is derived
from Storer v. Brown, a Supreme Court decision upholding a California law
requiring candidates to disaffiliate from a political party for one year and to
obtain 5% of the electorate’s signatures before running as an Independent in
an election.52 The law prohibited primary campaign losers from spoiling the
general election for primary winners. Term Limits summarized the Storer
decision as allowing a state to regulate election procedures, and “not even
arguably impos[ing] any substantive qualification [on] a class of potential
candidates.”53
Yet, determining whether a law imposes a substantive qualification is
no easy task. “The rule is not self-executing and is no substitute for the hard
judgments that must be made.”54 A substantive characteristic—as the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit helpfully summarized in a case
in which it assessed a law requiring candidates to pay a filing fee in order to
run for political office—is something “inherent in [each] candidate.”55 It is
“involved in the constitution or essential character of something,”56 and
“existing in something as a permanent, essential, or characteristic
attribute.”57
A law review article, written by Danielle Lang, expanded on the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s definition. The Article
48. See Neil Gorsuch & Michael Guzman, Will the Gentlemen Please Yield? A Defense of
the Constitutionality of State-Imposed Term Limitations, 20 HOFSTRA. L. REV. 341, 355 (1991).
49. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 832.
50. Id. at 836.
51. Id. at 831.
52. Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
53. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 835.
54. Storer, 415 U.S. at 730 (“[A]s a practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of
elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to
accompany the democratic processes.”).
55. Biener v. Calio, 361 F.3d 206, 212 (3d Cir. 2004).
56. Merriam Webster Dictionary Online (2019), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dic
tionary/inherent.
57. Oxford Dictionary (2019), https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/inherent.
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described a law imposing a substantive qualification as excluding access to
the ballot “based on personal characteristics—things that cannot be changed,
at least not at the point of election.”58 Such laws differ from permissible
“laws that ask candidates to do something any candidate could do in order to
gain ballot access.”59 Courts should use the release laws as a chance to
cement this definition of qualification into case law.
The Constitution coheres with this definition. Whether one was born
naturally in the United States60 is dictated by the past and cannot be changed.
Likewise, whether one has lived thirty-five years on Earth or has been a
United States resident for fourteen years61 is dictated by the past and cannot
be changed at the point of election.
Case law also comports with the proposed definition of a substantive
characteristic. In Term Limits, the Court properly struck down the Arkansas
law because a candidate could never change whether they had served three
terms in the House or two terms in the Senate.62 Similarly, in Powell v.
McCormack, Mr. Powell could not undo his misuse of House funds.63 Other
imaginable laws using this Article’s definition of a substantive characteristic
would easily be struck down, including laws limiting candidacy to veterans,
lawyers, persons without a felony record,64 or persons with certain IQs.65
These laws would be dictated by past action and impossible to change at the
point of election.
The release laws do not target an inherent or substantive characteristic
of candidates. Until a candidate releases her tax returns, she will have the
characteristic of not releasing returns. Similarly, like the law upheld in
Storer v. Brown, until a candidate obtains 5% of the electorate’s signatures,
she will have the characteristic of not obtaining such signatures.66 Both such
characteristics, however, could easily change while running for office: a
candidate could either consent to release of their returns or obtain signatures

58. Danielle Lang, Candidate Disclosure and Ballot Access Bills: Novel Questions on Voting
and Disclosure, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 46, 55 (2017).
59. Id.
60. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“No person except a natural born Citizen . . . shall be
eligible to the Office of the President.”).
61. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 5 (“[N]either shall any person be eligible to that Office
who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty-five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident
within the United States.”).
62. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 779.
63. Powell, 395 U.S. at 486.
64. Danielson v. Fitzsimmons, 44 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. 1950).
65. Of course, laws that target protected constitutional classes such as women or racial
minorities would also be struck down for violating the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause.
66. Storer, 415 U.S. at 724.
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from 5% of the electorate. Not targeting a substantial characteristic is step
one of passing constitutional muster. Release law’s constitutional issues get
murkier from here.
IV. Burden on the Candidate
Under Term Limits, even if a law does not target a class of candidates,
it is an unconstitutional qualification if it impermissibly “handicaps” or
“bars” a candidate from running for political office.67 This language from
Term Limits is borrowed from prior case law that assessed the burdens placed
on a candidate under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.68 The
Amendments protect two “overlapping” rights, forming “interwoven strands
of liberty”: the right of the candidate to advance her political beliefs, and the
right of voters to support candidates who share their political beliefs.69 To
assess whether the law is an impermissible handicap or bar, courts weigh the
burden to the candidate against the state’s relevant interest.70 This balance
is no “litmus-paper test,” but instead, is a “matter of degree.”71 The release
laws introduce novel burdens and justifications, with no clear resolution.
A. Administrative Burden on the Candidate
Often, courts have assessed a law’s burden based on the administrative
feasibility of compliance. For instance, in Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Court
struck down a March filing deadline for a November election for being too
early,72 and, in Williams v. Rhodes, it rejected a requirement to obtain
signatures from 15% of the electorate for being too large.73 Unlike these
67. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 831–32.
68. The case law bleeds the analysis for what constitutes a qualification with the First and
Fourteenth Amendment analysis. See, e.g., Biener, 361 F.3d at 212–13 (Third Circuit framing a
filing fee as an impermissible handicap based on “wealth” and a violation of an indigent candidate’s
Fourteenth Amendment rights under the Equal Protection Clause); see also Storer, 415 U.S. at 728–
36 (analyzing the First and Fourteenth Amendments simultaneously with the Qualifications
Clause).
69. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 787 (1983) (citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S.
23, 30–31 (1968)).
70. See id. at 789 (“A court must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . It then must identify
and evaluate the interests put forward by the State to justify the burden imposed by its rule.”).
71. Storer, 415 U.S. at 730; but see Schaefer v. Townsend, 215 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir.
2000) (In dicta, the Ninth Circuit stated that the balancing test is anachronistic. But Schaefer dealt
with a California law requiring residency prior to winning the election, which directly conflicted
with the U.S. Constitution’s text regarding residency once elected, so no balance was needed. For
cases that do not target a substantive characteristic nor directly conflict with constitutional text, the
law must be assessed by balancing state interests against burdens to candidates.).
72. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 780 (1983).
73. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).

(DO NOT DELETE)

Fall 2019]

10/7/2019 11:33 AM

RELEASING THE 1040, NOT SO EZ

29

laws, release laws are not administratively burdensome: each private citizen
earning a threshold income must complete a tax return in order to comply
with federal law74—independent of their decision to run for political office.75
Therefore, the administrative burden is as simple as consenting to the release
of already-completed tax forms.
In fact, Congress already requires presidential candidates to comply
with a process more administratively burdensome than the release of
prepared returns. Under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Congress
mandated that all presidential candidates submit a financial disclosure
statement.76 A candidate must report any source of income—including
transactions, liabilities, and assets—greater than $200.77 Candidates
complete financial disclosure forms from scratch. Completing such forms
can be “excessive,” as one lawyer put it, and prevent “good people from
running for office.”78 These disclosure requirements have never been found
unconstitutional.
Imposing an administrative burden is not the only way to improperly
hinder a candidate, however. In Shub v. Simpson, a Maryland court struck
down a law requiring congressional candidates to swear an oath to the state
constitution that prohibited membership to a subversive organization.79 In
United States v. Richmond, a federal district court struck down a plea
agreement that required a member of Congress to agree to not run for reelection.80 Giving an oath or signing a plea bargain could be completed
with administrative ease; taking a few minutes at most. Nonetheless, those
actions were impermissible because they burdened the candidate’s access
to the ballot in other ways by prohibiting membership to an organization
74. 26 U.S.C. § 6012(a) (2018).
75. See, e.g. Presidential Primary Elections: Ballot Access: Hearing on S. 149 Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 2017 Leg., 2017-2018 Sess. (Cal. 2017) (report from Sen. Mike McGuire,
Chairman, S. Governance & Fin. Comm.) (Presumably, states would not require tax return release
for candidates who did not complete returns because they earned below the threshold amount and
were not required to file federal tax returns.).
76. 5 U.S.C.A. App. 4 § 101 (2006).
77. 5 U.S.C.A. App. 4 § 102 (2012); see also Richard Rubin, What a Presidential
Candidate’s Financial Disclosures Do, and Do Not, Reveal, BLOOMBERG (May 15, 2015, 7:10
AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2015-05-15/what-a-presidential-candidate-sfinancial-disclosures-do-and-do-not-reveal.
78. Marlena Baldacci, Presidential Candidates Have Long History of Releasing Tax Returns,
CNN (July 16, 2012, 8:26 PM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/07/16/presidentialcandidates-have-long-history-of-releasing-tax-returns/ (quoting Rob Kelner, attorney at Covington
and Burling LLP).
79. 76 A.2d 332, 339–40 (Md. 1950). The Shub court did not base its holding on the First
Amendment right to association because it was not explicitly recognized in 1950, but the right
would almost certainly be implicated today. Cf. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958).
80. 550 F.Supp. 605 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
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and by leveraging the criminal justice system against the candidate’s
decision to run.
B. Privacy Burden on the Candidate
With the release laws, the candidate would be burdened by what the
returns reveal much more than by the administrative action required to
comply. Tax returns contain private financial information that may have no
bearing on how a candidate would serve as President. As one commentator
argued, returns contain information for “prurient” interests only.81 For
instance, during the 2012 United States presidential election, Mitt Romney
delayed releasing his tax returns.82 Commentators suspected that Romney
hesitated because the returns would reveal how much he donated to the
Mormon Church, information that could be abused by voters who dislike the
Church of Latter-Day Saints.83 Tax returns could implicate other personal
affairs unrelated to public office such as private gifts to in-laws in financial
straits,84 medical surgery payments,85 or business interests that could assist
competitors.86
For this reason, a candidate may challenge the release laws under the
constitutional right to informational privacy,87 offering courts an opportunity
to clarify this undefined right. In NASA v. Nelson, a contract employee sued
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (“NASA”) because the
agency conducted a standard background check that included collecting
information regarding employees’ recent drug use and contacting

81. Edward Morrissey, Romney Voyeurs: Digging for Tax Return Porn, FISCAL TIMES (Jan.
19, 2012), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Columns/2012/01/19/Romney-Voyeurs-Digging-forTax-Return-Porn.
82. Doug Mataconis, Should Presidential Candidates Be Expected to Release Their Tax
Returns?, OUTSIDE the BELTWAY (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/shouldpresidential-candidates-be-expected-to-release-their-tax-returns/.
83. Id.; see also Mitt Romney, Tax Returns from 2011, TAXNOTES 333 http://www.
taxhistory.org/thp/presreturns.nsf/Returns/9F81699BC7D6DE238525798F0051C35F/$file/M_Ro
mney_2011.pdf (showing a donation of $1,115,484 to The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints).
84. DEP’T of the TREAS., IRS, Instructions for Form 709: United States Gift (2018), https://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i709.pdf.
85. DEP’T of the TREAS., IRS, Publication 502: Medical and Dental Expenses (2018), https://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p502.pdf.
86. See Russell v. Bd. of Plumbing Exam’rs of Cty. of Westchester, 74 F.Supp. 2d 339, 348
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (striking down a New York law that required plumbers to release tax returns in
order to receive plumbing license).
87. All ballot access laws are subjected to external constitutional provisions—such as the
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Fourth Amendments—although the First and Fourteenth
Amendments are most commonly the bars.
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88

references.
In deciding for NASA, the Supreme Court assumed a
constitutional “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters,”89 but
subjected that “interest” to a deferential balancing test, which tipped in favor
of the government.90 Under the test, the Court ruled that the Government
had a legitimate interest in ensuring its employees were not taking illicit
drugs, which was more significant than the plaintiff’s privacy interest
because the Privacy Act ensured the information collected by the
Government would not be disseminated publicly.91 In Whalen v. Roe, nearly
forty years before Nelson, the Court upheld a New York statute that allowed
the state to collect personal information on all New Yorkers who were
prescribed certain drugs.92 The Court believed such a system—used to
combat illicit drug use—was an “orderly and rational legislative decision.”93
In the same year as Whalen, President Richard Nixon raised a privacy
interest trying to prevent release of his presidential papers under the postWatergate Presidential Records Act of 1978.94 The Court concluded that the
papers could be made public because they dealt with presidential duties, so
the public interest in transparency outweighed President Nixon’s privacy
interest.95
The release laws go beyond the actions upheld in the NASA, Whalen,
and Nixon triad. First, the laws seek to publicly disseminate private matters
protected by statute against disclosure. In NASA and Whalen, the Court
found it significant that privacy statutes prevented public dissemination.96
This protection is not available with release laws. In fact, nearly all of the
laws’ power comes from public dissemination.97 Second, unlike Nixon’s
presidential papers, the release laws disseminate more personal material—a
88. 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011).
89. Id. (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977) and Nixon v. Admin. of Gen.
Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977)).
90. The Court’s use of “interest,” as opposed to “right,” is significant. The Supreme Court
has been hesitant to find a “right” to informational privacy. Many have attempted to argue a right
exists by combining the penumbra of the Constitution’s First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments along with seminal cases, such as: Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Olmstead
v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928); Stanley v. Ga., 394 U.S. 557 (1969); and Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497 (1961). See, e.g., Constitutional Law, The Supreme Court 2010 Term, Leading Cases, 125
HARV. L. REV. 172, 237 (2011).
91. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 156 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)).
92. 429 U.S. at 591 (1977).
93. Id. at 597.
94. See generally Nixon v. Admin. of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
95. Id. at 457–65.
96. Nelson, 562 U.S. at 156 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)); Whalen, 429 U.S. at 601–02 (looking
to state law protections against public disclosure).
97. Infra at Section VII.B: “The Timing: When and How Enforcement of Release Laws
Should Occur.”
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candidate’s private finances. In dicta, the Nixon Court acknowledged
“matters concerned with family or personal finances” may have some
constitutional protection if those papers are “unrelated to any acts done by
[the President] in their public capacity.”98 Release laws bring this
unanswered hypothetical to life.99
Courts must decide two significant issues to resolve the privacy hurdles.
First, do presidential candidates’ reasonable expectation of privacy allow
them to avoid public dissemination of their finances?100 Candidates certainly
give up many privacy protections by entering the public arena,101 but it is
unclear how much privacy presidential candidates relinquish. For tax forms,
reasonable expectations of privacy may be lowered because most candidates
in recent history have voluntarily released the information.102 Second, are a
President’s finances relevant to their role as President? As explored later,
tax returns may provide critical information regarding whether a President
has conflicts of interest impacting her ability to govern.103 The release laws
afford courts an opportunity to further clarify the parameters of the
constitutional privacy interest104—and simultaneously address issues of
massive importance to the Office of the President.
Notably, even if a constitutional privacy interest does not invalidate the
release laws outright, courts will weigh a candidate’s privacy interest when
conducting the balancing test under the First and Fourteenth Amendments’
“interwoven strands of liberty.”105

98. Nixon, 433 U.S. at 457.
99. On July 12, 2019, during an oral argument for Donald Trump, et al. v. Mazars USA, LLP
at the D.C. Circuit, a case involving a subpoena from the House Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform seeking President Trump’s accounting documents, Judge Neomi Rao alluded
to this statement in Nixon v. Administrator of General Services. See 19-5142 (D.C. Cir. 2019)
(transcript not yet available).
100. Cf. Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
101. Cf. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
102. Karen Yourish, Clinton Released Her Taxes. Will Trump Follow This Tradition?, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/05/us/elections/presiden
tial-tax-returns.html.
103. Infra at Section V: “State Justifications for Release Laws.”
104. Cf. Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 78–79 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)
(“Financial transactions can reveal much about a person’s activities, associations, and beliefs. At
some point, governmental intrusion upon these areas would implicate legitimate expectations of
privacy.”); see NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 160 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (The lateAssociate Justice Antonin Scalia, who was skeptical of the parameters of the constitutional right to
privacy, argued that the Court cannot “invent a constitutional right out of whole cloth” without
“tying it to some words of the Constitution.”).
105. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787–89.
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C. Punitive Burden for Noncompliance
In addition to assessing what a candidate must do to comply with a
ballot access law, courts also factor in the punishment for noncompliance.
Prior to Term Limits, some courts viewed state regulations as impermissible
if they absolutely barred candidates from running for political office for
noncompliance, but not if the laws permitted write-in or independent
candidacies.106 In Jenness v. Fortson, the Supreme Court upheld a law that
placed a petition deadline on third-party candidates because it offered writein candidacy as an alternative to inclusion on the ballot if the candidates
failed to comply.107 Term Limits assessed the low success rate of write-in
candidates for congressional races, and rejected it as too formalistic to serve
as a viable alternative to ballot access.108
For release laws, courts need to complete similar fact-finding about a
presidential candidate’s success of winning office without placement on the
ballot. A presidential candidate may be more likely to win via write-in than
a congressional candidate. Presidential candidates, especially of major
political parties, would have higher name recognition. Furthermore,
presidential candidates may still win with faithless electors who serve in the
Electoral College,109 whereas no such safety valve exists for congressional
office.
Nonetheless, not placing a candidate’s name on the ballot is a
significant punishment to a candidate. Notably, it is a far greater punishment
than that imposed by the Ethics in Government Act, where failure to submit
a financial disclosure may lead to civil penalties at most.110 Often, candidates
are granted extensions.111 The proposed release laws have offered no such

106. See, e.g., Hopfmann v. Connolly, 746 F.2d 97, 103 (1st Cir. 1984) (defining qualifications
only on whether the law fully disqualified candidates from obtaining office).
107. 403 U.S. 431, 440 (1971).
108. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 831 n.45 (1995); see also id. at 829 (determining legislative
intent to be to disqualify a candidate from holding office even if they could run as a write-in).
109. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death: Closing the
Constitution’s Succession Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215 (1994); Robert W. Bennett, The Problem of
the Faithless Elector: Trouble Aplenty Brewing Just Below the Surface in Choosing the President,
100 NW. U. L. REV. 121 (2006).
110. 5 U.S.C.A. App. 4 § 104 (2007); cf. U.S. v. Rose, 28 F.3d 181, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994); U.S.
v. Gant, 268 F. Supp. 2d 29, 30 (D.D.C. 2003).
111. Richard Rubin, What a Presidential Candidate’s Financial Disclosures Do, and Do Not,
Reveal, BLOOMBERG (May 15, 2015, 3:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/
articles/ 2015-05-15/what-a-presidential-candidate-s-financial-disclosures-do-and-do-not-reveal;
Dave Levinthal (@davelevinthal), TWITTER (April 27, 2016, 6:24 AM) https://twitter.com/
davelevinthal /status/725677061084446720 (E-mail from Brad C. Deutsch, Lead Counsel of Bernie
Sanders Campaign, to Tracey Ligon, Federal Election Commission, requesting 45-day extension
of deadline for filing Senator Sanders’ personal financial disclosure report.).
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leniency, requiring political candidates to release tax returns by a certain date
or be excluded from the ballot.112
V. State Justifications for Release Laws
The release law’s justifications will be weighed against its burdens.
Thus far, proponents of release laws have articulated broad social interests
at stake, including educating voters, ensuring public confidence in the
political system, and retaining honest officials.113 These justifications echo
the interests promoted by the Ethics in Government Act, which “w[as]
designed to increase public confidence in the federal government,
demonstrate the integrity of government officials, deter conflicts of interest,
deter unscrupulous persons from entering public service, and enhance the
ability of the citizenry to judge the performance of public officials.”114
Because release laws will reveal more intimate details and punish more
harshly than current disclosure laws in the Ethics in Government Act, the
release laws need to more clearly particularize the interests at stake. Release
laws, at root, seek to notify the electorate about potential conflicts of interest
a candidate may have. For instance, it can inform the public as to the
reasoning behind a candidate’s policy position if the candidate owns
extensive real estate and opposes closing interest deductions.115
These conflict of interest justifications implicate constitutional
provisions with little case law: the Domestic and Foreign Emoluments
Clauses. The Domestic Emoluments Clause forbids the President from
accepting money—and other things of value—from state governments,
while allowing for just compensation from the federal government.116 The

112. See, e.g., Presidential Tax Transparency and Accountability Act, S. 27, 2018-2019 Reg.
Sess. (Cal. 2019), https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920
200SB27.
113. See, e.g., Mitchell Zuckoff, Why We Ask to See Candidates’ Tax Returns, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/06/opinion/why-we-ask-to-see-candidates-taxreturns.html?_r=0 (“The American people need to know if their president is a crook.”); see also
Gregory Krieg, From Tweets to the Streets: Nationwide Anti-Trump ‘Tax Day’ Marches Came
Together on Social Media, CNN (Apr. 14, 2017, 3:16 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/14/
politics/trump-tax-day-march-protests/ (“This is about transparency, ethics, and the basic function
of democracy.”); Governor Gavin Newsom Signs SB 27: Tax Transparency Bill, STATE OF
CALIFORNIA (July 31, 2019), https://www.gov.ca.gov/2019/07/30/governor-gavin-newsom-signssb-27-tax-transparency-bill/.
114. See U.S v. Oakar, 111 F.3d 146, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (citing S. Rep. No. 95-170, at 21–
22 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4216, 4237–38).
115. See Alan Rappeport, Democrats See Opening in Tax Overhaul Fight: Trump’s Own
Deductions, N.Y. TIMES (April 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/
democrats-see-opening-in-tax-overhaul-fight-trumps-own-deductions.html.
116. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (the President is prohibited from receiving “any other
Emolument from the United States, or any of them”).
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Foreign Emoluments Clause forbids the President from accepting things of
value from foreign governments, unless Congress consents.117 The Clauses
were relatively unexamined in constitutional law for many decades, but
nonetheless, they exist to prevent “external influence”118 over and
“corruption”119 of federal officials. The Framers feared that, without these
Clauses, other governments might curry favor with United States’ federal
officeholders, which would undermine the republic.120 Release of tax returns
may reveal a candidate’s financial entanglements with other sovereigns.
Without this knowledge, a President could violate a constitutional provision
with impunity. The Emoluments Clauses, therefore, offer states a
constitutional hook to challenge conflicts of interest. And yet, courts have
never had occasion until recently to understand the reach of these clauses
and what they regulate.121 Release laws provide a vehicle to flesh out these
provisions.
A. How State Justifications Cohere with Case Law
The interests proffered for release laws move beyond typical
justifications for state regulation. Primarily, courts have found constitutional
laws that target Election Day processes.122 Term Limits acknowledged laws
that sought to avoid voter confusion and lessen ballot overcrowding on
Election Day.123 For instance, Term Limits cited Munro v. Socialist Workers
Party, a case in which a Socialist Workers Party candidate challenged a
Washington statute that required minority-party candidates to receive 1% of
the vote in the primary election to appear on the general election ballot.124
The Court upheld the law, agreeing with the state’s desire to avoid voter

117. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under [the
United States], shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument,
Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State”).
118. David Cole, Trump is Violating the Constitution, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Feb. 23,
2017), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/02/23/donald-trump-is-violating-the-constitution/
#fn-1 (citing 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 389
(1987)).
119. Id. (citing 3 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 327
(1987)).
120. See generally Norman L. Eisen, et al., The Emoluments Clause: It’s Text, Meaning, and
Application to Donald J. Trump, BROOKINGS (Dec. 16, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/
research/the-emoluments-clause-its-text-meaning-and-application-to-donald-j-trump/.
121. See, e.g., Sharon LaFraniere, Judge Rejects Government’s Request to Halt Emoluments
Suit Against Trump, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/25/us/polit
ics/trump-emoluments-lawsuit.html.
122. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 834.
123. Id.
124. 479 U.S 189 (1986).

(DO NOT DELETE)

36

10/7/2019 11:33 AM

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 47:1

confusion that may arise from an Election Day ballot with too many
candidates.125
In Anderson v. Celebrezze, the Supreme Court struck down a March
filing deadline for independent candidates as prohibitively early given that
many campaign changes could occur between March and the November
election, but nonetheless, it hinted at a state interest beyond Election Day
processes to “foster[] informed and educated expressions of the popular will
in a general election.”126 Anderson’s justification for voter education could
be expanded to justify the release laws. In Anderson, the Court wanted to
provide voters with enough time to become familiar with candidates so that
voters recognized the options available to them on the ballot.127 Release laws
go beyond Anderson: seeking to educate the electorate about the candidates’
specific finances, and not just the candidates’ names. But Anderson’s
justification could be the opening thread of precedent for states to justify
release laws.
In addition to the Anderson ruling, the Ninth Circuit, in Joyner v.
Mofford, upheld a state law that sought to prevent abuse of office before and
after an election.128 Joyner reviewed an Arizona statute preventing state
officials from running for federal office unless they were serving their final
year in their elected position.129 The court upheld the law, acknowledging
that Arizona had an interest in ensuring state officials would not be corrupted
by donations for their federal candidacy.130 The court worried a losing
candidate of a federal election could provide favors to federal campaign
donors from her state office.131 The court upheld the Arizona law, finding it
primarily regulated Arizona officeholders, and tangentially regulated federal
candidates.132 Unlike the law in Joyner, release laws do not primarily
regulate state officials—an inherent power of state government.
Nonetheless, both the law in Joyner and release laws share a justification in
ending corruption, and, as will be explored now, states may have a special
prerogative to ensure the President takes office without significant conflicts
of interest.

125. Id. at 196.
126. 460 U.S. 780, 796 (1983).
127. Id. at 796–97.
128. 706 F.2d 1523 (9th Cir. 1983).
129. Id. at 1525.
130. Id. at 1532.
131. Id. at 1532 n.10 (speculating that a Board of Supervisor may receive donations from
persons who contribute knowing they will be rewarded with zoning decisions if the candidate is to
lose her federal race).
132. Id. at 1531.
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VI. States as Gatekeepers
States may have a stronger claim regulating access to the presidency
than access to a congressional seat. Per the Constitution, states are a
“gatekeeper” deciding who may occupy the White House.
Term Limits wrongfully overlooked how broadly states may regulate
presidential elections. In Term Limits, despite addressing a law only
targeting congressional candidacies, the Majority offhandedly noted that
states retain the same limited powers in presidential elections as in
congressional elections.133 It may be true—as Term Limits mentioned—that
states have no greater “reserved powers” emanating from the Tenth
Amendment for presidential elections than congressional elections.134 But
textually, via the Electoral College, states have been delegated much greater
power for presidential elections.
Surprisingly, the breadth of power is unsettled. Three decades before
Term Limits, Justice Potter Stewart argued the states had very broad
discretion in establishing qualifications because of the powers delegated to
them in Article II.135 Stewart’s argument has not been properly settled. This
Article will explore the inherent uncertainty of the Electoral College that
leads to a clash between the Constitution’s text and Term Limits’ structural
analysis—and the need for courts to resolve this dispute in order to assess
the constitutionality of release laws.
A. Textual Delegation
1. How Much Power Has Been Given?
The Constitution’s text contains three notable differences in state power
between Article I for congressional elections and Article II for presidential
elections: the textual interpretation of “manner,” the scope of federal
oversight, and the delegation to different entities.136
133. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 803–04 (quoting 1 Story § 627) (“Representatives and Senators
are as much officers of the entire Union as is the President. States thus ‘have just as much right,
and no more, to prescribe new qualifications for a representative, as they have for a president . . .
It is no original prerogative of state power to appoint a representative, a senator, or president for
the union.’”).
134. Id.; see also supra at Section II: “The Background Case Law: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton.”
135. Williams, 393 U.S. at 48–51 (1968) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (finding that a state can set
qualifications so long as the law does not violate the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, or Twenty-Fourth
Amendments).
136. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of chusing
[sic] Senators.”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
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As explained earlier, ballot access cases wrestle over the definition of
“manner”—as it determines how broadly states may regulate elections.137 In
Article I, “manner” is cabined by “times” and “places.”138 Regulating the
“time” and “place” of an election is strictly an administrative matter related
to an election procedure. Under the canon of construction noscitur a sociis—
advising that a word in a list must be read in light of its corresponding
words139—it is correct to read “manner” in conjunction with “time” and
“place,” and thus, to permit narrow regulations of Election Day processes in
Article I.140 In Article II, however, “manner” sits alone.141 On its own,
“manner” carries a broad meaning: “a way in which a thing is done or
happens.”142 It must be given greater force than its more cabined use in
Article I.143

Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or
Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be
appointed an Elector.”).
137. Supra at Section III.A: “A Class of Candidates: Inherent Qualities Targeted”; see, e.g.,
Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 832 (1995) (addressing petitioner’s interpretation of “manner” within U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1); The Founders debated how broadly “manner” should be read, with some
believing it was given broad import. See, e.g., 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE
GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 49–50 (J. Elliot ed., 1836) (Massachusetts
ratifying convention debating the breadth of “manner”); see id. at 326–29 (New York ratifying
convention debating the breadth of “manner”).
138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of Chusing
Senators.”) (emphasis added)).
139. See U.S. v. Yates, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1085–86 (2015) (interpreting “tangible object” to be
limited to objects used to record and preserve information—and not to include a fish—because the
phrase came at the end of a list alongside “record” and “document”).
140. See, e.g., Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 511–12 (2001) (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285
U.S. 355, 366 (1932)) (“[M]anner . . . encompasses matters like ‘notices, registration, supervision
of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud, supervision of voting, protection of voters,
prevention of fraud and corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers,
and making and publication of election returns.”); see also supra at Section V.A: “How the State
Justifications Cohere with Case Law” (discussing state justifications pertaining to Election Day).
141. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors . . . .”).
142. Oxford Dictionary (2019), https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/manner.
143. Cf. Russello v. U.S., 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting U.S. v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720,
722 (5th Cir. 1972)) (“[W]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute
but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”); cf. Akhil R. Amar,
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999); see generally Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and
Structure Seriously: Reflection on Free-form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 1223 (1995).
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Furthermore, Article I provides a congressional veto of any state
regulation.144 James Madison wanted to empower the federal government to
check state governments. As he put it:
The policy of referring the appointment of the House of
Representatives to the people and not to the Legislatures of
the States, supposes that the result will be somewhat
influenced by the mode, This view of the question seems to
decide that the Legislatures of the States ought not to have
the [uncontrolled] right of regulating the times places &
manner of holding elections. These were words of great
latitude. It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that
might be made of the discretionary power.145
Article II has no such veto power.146 The incongruence in federal
oversight demonstrates that states have been delegated a different amount of
power in Article II compared to Article I. It is unclear how far the Article II
power stretches.
2. To Whom Has the Power Been Delegated?
Most importantly, the Constitution delegates the power to choose the
President to the state legislatures and the power to choose Congressmen to
the people. Article I provides that, “[t]he House of Representatives shall be
composed of Members chosen every second year by the People of the several
States.”147 Likewise, in the Seventeenth Amendment, “[t]he Senate of the
United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by
the people thereof.”148 On the other hand, in Article II, “[e]ach State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of
Electors” and the electors then choose the President.149 In choosing the
President, shockingly, the people need not be involved necessarily.150

144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“[T]he Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations.”).
145. 2 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 240 (1911),
http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/1786/0544-02_Bk.pdf.
146. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
148. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (emphasis added).
149. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (emphasis added).
150. Since the mid-1800s, all states let their people choose the President, but the Constitution
does not mandate such a system. See AKHIL R. AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY
152–56 (2005).
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Term Limits relied on “the people” directly choosing their
congressmen.151 As the Court summarized, “the Framers, in perhaps their
most important contribution, conceived of a Federal Government directly
responsible to the people, possessed of direct power over the people, and
chosen directly, not by States, but by the people.”152 Furthermore, the Term
Limits Court looked to the history of choosing senators and observed
senators used to be chosen by “the Legislature thereof,”153 but now are
chosen by direct election because of the Seventeenth Amendment.154 As the
Court conceded, prior to the Seventeenth Amendment, state legislatures
maintained a greater “express delegation of power” in choosing senators.155
Despite these observations, the Majority did not consider its implications for
Article II, which still grants the power to the state legislatures. It is unclear,
therefore, how Term Limits applies to the Qualifications Clauses’ exclusivity
when Article II—and not Article I—is at issue.
3. How Has the Power Been Used?
State legislatures have exercised greater delegated power in presidential
elections throughout our history. In 1892, in McPherson v. Blacker, the
Court acknowledged “plenary authority” for states to choose the process by
which electoral votes would be given.156 In doing so, it observed that the
state legislatures retained absolute power—including directly choosing who
received the electoral votes—in the first presidential election.157 This
continued for many more elections.158 Based on this historical practice, as
well as the Constitution’s textual delegation, the Court concluded that Article

151. Supra at Section II: “The Background Case Law: US Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton”
(arguing that the Majority relied on the structural argument that people directly choose
representatives to reach its conclusion).
152. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 821 (emphasis added).
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1.
154. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 821.
155. Id. at 804 n.16.
156. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892) (“The [C]onstitution does not provide that
the appointment of electors shall be by popular vote, nor that the electors shall be voted for upon a
general ticket, nor that the majority of those who exercise the elective franchise can alone choose
the electors. It recognizes that the people act through their representatives in the legislature, and
leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the method of effecting the object.”) (emphasis
added); see also Burroughs v. U.S., 290 U.S. 534 (1934) (granting plenary power to choosing the
manner of appointment of electors under U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1).
157. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 8; see also Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and Its
Meager Federalism, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 195, 199 (2004) (“What is most striking about the limited
[Founding] debate was the dominance of one position—a distrust of the “people” to elect the
President.”).
158. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 8–9.
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II “convey[s] the broadest power of determination” to the states.
Bush v.
Gore echoed McPherson’s reading, with all sides in Bush acknowledging the
federal government must take state’s legislative election schemes “as they
come.”160
B. The Constitution’s Text and History Conflict with Term Limits’
Focus on Uniformity
Yet, despite this textual and historical support giving broad power to
states in choosing the President,161 such an outcome clashes with the
structural analysis from Term Limits. This clash arises from an internal
tension in the Constitution: it has separated who chooses the President from
whom the President represents.162 The President is chosen by 50 separate
sovereigns, but represents all Americans at once.
This incongruence invokes Term Limits’ concern about the
fragmentation of election laws.163 In Term Limits, the Court feared disunity
of campaign laws would hurt the representation of all people.164 Arguably,
a “patchwork”165 of laws would be even more worrisome in choosing the
President than choosing Congressmen. It is one thing for the State of
Arkansas to limit who can become an Arkansas Senator; it is quite another
for Arkansas to limit who becomes President—or more accurately, for
Arkansas to limit who wins its six electoral votes, and thus impact who
becomes President. The negative externalities from one state’s laws are
amplified when choosing one position that governs all fifty states.166 As
159. Id. at 13.
160. 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 148 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that state constitutional provisions regulate the state legislature as well); see
also id. at 113 (Justice Rehnquist arguing that a federal question is raised if the state departs
significantly from its legislative process.); see also Richard L. Hasen, How States Could Force
Trump to Release His Tax Returns, POLITICO.com (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.politico.com/
magazine/story/2017/03/donald-trump-tax-returns-release-214950 (noting that Bush v. Gore’s
focus on state power in electing the president bolster release laws).
161. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2, cl. 4 (In Article II, there are a few limits to state power
in the Electoral College, including how many electors each state receives, who may be an elector,
and when the electors must vote.).
162. Cf. Heather Lardy, The Constitutional Limits of Democratic Choice: US Term Limits Inc.
v. Thornton, 25 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 376, 391 (1996) (analyzing the political theory for electing
congressmen).
163. See, e.g., Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 803 (“Representatives and Senators are as much
officers of the entire Union as is the President.”) (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 822.
165. Id. at 780.
166. Danielle Lang argues that relying on state power to uphold release laws would hurt
democracy. See Danielle Lang, Candidate Disclosure and Ballot Access Bills: Novel Questions on
Voting and Disclosure, 65 UCLA L. REV. DISC. 46, 53 (2017) (“By relying on state plenary
authority over presidential electors to justify the disclosure law, advocates would be opening a
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noted in Anderson v. Celebrezze, “in the context of the presidential election,
state-imposed restrictions implicate a uniquely important national interest . . .
[f]or the President and the Vice President of the United States are the only
elected officials who represent all the voters in the Nation.”167 Justice
Thomas, despite generally arguing for broad state powers in Term Limits,
also addressed increased negative externalities for presidential elections and
concluded Arkansas cannot set qualifications for the President.168
Notably, the negative externalities may be lessened with the enactment
of release laws. If one state releases a candidate’s returns, the information
could then be disseminated to all fifty states. Therefore, even if a state
requires a different amount of information be released than a neighboring
state, the net result will be national uniformity because all voters will
ultimately have access to the same information.169 Nonetheless, the release
laws serving as a barrier to the presidential ballot—as opposed to their effect
in releasing information—maintains the uniformity concerns articulated in
Term Limits.
The Fourteenth Amendment also serves as a catalyst for uniformity.
The Electoral College does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment’s
“one person, one vote” rule,170 but adding qualifications may violate other
Fourteenth Amendment principles. McPherson’s observation that states
have plenary power—made in 1892 during the post-Reconstruction
expansion of states’ rights—narrowly read the Fourteenth Amendment, as
“not . . . radically chang[ing] the whole theory of the relations of the state
and federal governments to each other.”171 Such a reading of the Fourteenth
Amendment is inaccurate today.172

‘Pandora’s box,’ in which states could interfere with the democratic process by choosing how the
state’s presidential electors will be selected based on something altogether different than the
popular vote in the state. For those hoping to improve our democratic system through transparency,
the risks of this approach are not worth the reward.”) (citations omitted).
167. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 794–95 (footnote omitted).
168. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 861 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Even though the Arkansas
Legislature enjoys the reserved power to pass a minimum-wage law for Arkansas, it has no power
to pass a minimum-wage law for Vermont. For the same reason, Arkansas may not decree that
only Arkansas citizens are eligible to be President of the United States; the selection of the President
is not up to Arkansas alone, and Arkansas can no more prescribe the qualifications for that office
than it can set the qualifications for Members of Congress from Florida. But none of this suggests
that Arkansas cannot set qualifications for Members of Congress from Arkansas.”).
169. But see Eric T. Tollar, Playing the Trump Card: The Perils of Encroachment Resulting
from Ballot Restrictions, 51 SUFFOLK. U. L. REV. 695, 717 (2018) (discussing negative spillover
effect from one state passing a release law).
170. See Sanders v. Gray, 372 U.S. 368, 380–81 (1963).
171. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 12 (1892).
172. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).

(DO NOT DELETE)

Fall 2019]

10/7/2019 11:33 AM

RELEASING THE 1040, NOT SO EZ

43

Furthermore, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause
cautions against additional qualifications. As Justice Harlan argued, the
Electoral College is a state institution, and as such, it must hear from all
persons who want to support a candidate.173 Qualifications kicking a
candidate off the presidential ballot would prevent the people from being
heard. But these arguments have never been cemented into Supreme Court
case law. Instead, states are left retaining an undefined amount of power in
choosing the President.
Given the ambiguity between text, history, and structure emanating
from the Electoral College, release laws offer a new opportunity to establish
the power states have in choosing the President.
VII. States as the Refuge of Last Resort
Even if states do not obtain absolute power in choosing the President,
release laws expose a vacuum of curbing presidential corruption within the
Constitution’s structure, and states can argue they are the best-positioned
constitutional actors to fill the void. In other words, states are the refuge of
last resort for disclosure as a means to prevent conflicts of interest in the
nation’s highest office. To assess the structural gaps, this Article will
analyze who should enforce presidential conflicts of interest as well as when
and how enforcement should occur.
A. The Institutional Actor: Who Should Enforce Release Laws
States stand guard to police presidential corruption. To understand their
power, it is best to start with the other constitutional actors’ weaknesses. The
Executive Branch cannot be expected to police the President, as that office
serves over the entire branch.174
The Judiciary is also in a poor position to police presidential conflicts
of interest. Plaintiffs harmed by presidential corruption face significant
hurdles in the courts. It is difficult to establish Article III standing, especially
when the extent of conflicts is unknown. In fact, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently dismissed a lawsuit filed by the
District of Columbia and Maryland against President Trump for Emoluments
violations because the plaintiffs lacked standing.175 Even if a plaintiff could

173. See Williams, 393 U.S. at 42 (Harlan, J., concurring).
174. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
175. In re Donald J. Trump, No. 18-2846 (4th Cir. July 10, 2019), http://www.ca4.uscourts.
gov/opinions/182486.P.pdf. On September 13, 2019, however, the Second Circuit found that a
restaurant owner and restaurant organization had standing to allege President Trump violated the
Emoluments Clauses. See Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, Restaurant
Opportunities Centers United, Inc., Jill Phaneuf, and Eric Goode v. Donald J. Trump, No. 18-474
(2d. Cir. Sept. 13, 2019).
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establish constitutional standing, courts may cite a prudential concern
against ruling on a “question[] of broad social import.”176 Furthermore, a
court may rule that the Emoluments Clauses do not provide a private cause
of action.177 Additionally, courts may invoke the political question doctrine
by interpreting the Constitution as textually committing the policing of
presidential conflicts of interest to Congress and not to the courts.178
Furthermore, courts may believe there are no clear, judicially enforceable
rules to apply for assessing whether a conflict of interest exists.179 Given
these barriers, Article III is poorly positioned to curb corruption in the White
House.
Congress, unlike the other two federal branches, is better positioned to
police presidential conflicts of interest. If states are able to mandate tax
return release as a precondition for getting on the ballot, presumably, so too
could Congress.180 Furthermore, congressional committees with tax law
jurisdiction—particularly, the House Committee on Ways and Means and
the Senate Committee on Finance—could request to view the returns in
closed session, as the Ways and Means Committee has done for President
Trump’s returns.181
But Congress is inhibited from policing presidential conflicts of interest
in two ways. First, many conflict of interest statutes do not apply to the
176. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 387 (3rd ed. 2000)
(quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979)) (acknowledging courts
may avoid deciding an issue, especially when “no individual rights would be vindicated”).
177. In re Donald J. Trump, No. 18-2846, at *24 (4th Cir. July 10, 2019), http://www.ca4.
uscourts.gov/opinions/182486.P.pdf (expressing skepticism that the Emoluments Clauses provide
a cause of action).
178. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 366–68 (3rd ed. 2000)
(discussing the political question doctrine generally); cf. Nixon v. U.S., 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993)
(ruling that the impeachment power is textually committed to Congress); see also Josh Blackman,
Larry Tribe Calls My Emoluments Clause Analysis a ‘Linguistic Sleight of Hand’, JOSH
BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Jan. 26, 2017), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2017/01/26/larry-tribe-callsmy-emoluments-clause-analysis-a-linguistic-sleight-of-hand/ (advancing the argument that the
Foreign Emoluments Clause is textually committed to Congress because Congress can, if it
chooses, consent to the president receiving foreign emoluments).
179. As constitutional scholars have recently focused on the Emoluments Clauses, many have
disagreed on what precisely constitutes an “emolument,” and on the differing scope between the
Domestic Emoluments Clause and the Foreign Emoluments Clause. Courts may find themselves
ill-suited to draw such lines with complicated financial information, especially given the
Emoluments Clauses’ dearth of case law. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Adler, Does the Emoluments
Clause Lawsuit Against President Trump Stand a Chance, WASH. POST, (Jan. 23, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/01/23/does-the-emolumentsclause-lawsuit-against-president-trump-stand-a-chance/?utm_term=.4289d78ce4eb.
180. See, e.g., George K. Yin, Congressional Authority to Obtain and Release Tax Returns,
154 TAX NOTES 1013 (2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2927048
(analyzing constitutionality of a congressional release law).
181. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(f)(1) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-53).
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182

President because of structural impediments. For example, laws requiring
executive officials to divest financial holdings do not apply to the
President;183 nor do laws forbidding other executive employees from
receiving supplemental compensation.184 Congress cannot require such
obligations of the President without interfering with the Separation of
Powers.185 Second, for the congressional checks that could apply to the
President—including a potential release law or committee subpoena—
Congress has failed to act. Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon introduced a
national release law, but it has not moved out of the Senate.186 Without a
federal release law, Congress is left with subpoena and oversight of the
President once the people have voted him into office. The release laws offer
a far more effective preventative measure.
B. The Timing: When and How Enforcement Should Occur
A prophylactic disclosure of conflicts during the campaign is stronger
than post-inauguration enforcement. The two potential remedies postinauguration—a mandate that the President divest or face impeachment—
have severe deficiencies. First, the Department of Justice, Office of Legal
Counsel has advised that it is unconstitutional to require the Vice President
to divest from his finances.187 This opinion would almost certainly apply to
the President. Second, impeachment faces high hurdles, and provides a stark
remedy not clearly appropriate. Furthermore, solutions after the people
chose their President create further distrust amongst different political
groups.188

182. Of course, even though conflict of interest statutes do not apply to the President, the
Constitution’s Emoluments Clauses still apply to the President.
183. 18 U.S.C.A. § 202; see also Julie Bykowicz & Mark Sherman, Why Conflict of Interest
Rules Apply Differently to the President, PBS NEWSHOUR (Nov. 30, 2016, 4:47 PM), http://www.
pbs.org/newshour/rundown/conflict-interest-rules-apply-differently-president/ (“What’s a serious
matter for a second-term congressman with a small business has no equivalent for a president with
a multibillion-dollar empire.”).
184. 18 U.S.C. § 202 (2014); 18 U.S.C. § 209 (2004).
185. See JACK MASKELL, MEMORANDUM: CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE ON
CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND “ETHICS” PROVISIONS THAT MAY APPLY TO THE PRESIDENT (Nov.
22, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/conflict.pdf.
186. Editorial Board, An Antidote to Donald Trump’s Secrecy on Taxes, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/opinion/an-antidote-to-donald-trumps-secrecy-ontaxes.html.
187. LAURENCE H. SILBERMAN, MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD T. BURRESS, OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT (Aug. 28, 1974), https://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/olc/082874.pdf.
188. Cf. Fenit Nirappil, Blue-State Lawmakers Want to Keep Trump Off 2020 Ballot Unless
He Releases Tax Returns, WASH. POST (Jan. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/post-politics/wp/2017/01/03/blue-state-lawmakers-want-to-keep-trump-off-2020-ballot-unl
ess-he-releases-tax-returns/ (lawmaker calling release laws “sour grapes over the election”).
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Release laws, on the other hand, offer a simpler solution: Resolve the
issue before a candidate takes office and let the conflicts be judged at the
ballot box by the voters. As James Madison acknowledged while opposing
the Alien and Sedition Acts, “the right of freely examining public characters
and measures, and of free communication thereon” is “the only effectual
guardian of every other right.”189 Release laws build on this principle.
VIII. Tailoring: How it All Comes Together
Bringing it all together, release laws offer a chance for courts to clarify
the level of scrutiny applied to ballot access laws. Courts have never applied
a uniform level of scrutiny.190 Often, the level of scrutiny applied seems
determined by whether the law targets a “substantive” characteristic or a
fundamental right.191 Release laws do not target a substantive characteristic
nor a fundamental right, but the privacy interests and uniformity concerns
for electing the president make it likely courts will apply a scrutiny more
demanding than rational basis.192
States need to clarify their justifications for the release laws.
Unfortunately, with tax return release, there is a lingering problem for states:
they do not know what is in a return until it is disclosed. Before then, it is
all conjecture about potential conflicts or corruption. Nonetheless, states can
still articulate how each portion of a return could bolster its justifications.
States should carefully delineate what information has a legitimate
justification. For instance, states must justify how the release of a
candidate’s effective tax rate or charitable deductions serve an interest
related to a candidate’s future conduct in office, and not simply serve as
political fodder.193
189. James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan. 1800), http://press-pubs.
uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_speechs24.html.
190. See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433–34 (1992) (rejecting strict scrutiny, and instead
applying “a more flexible standard” that “weigh[s] ‘the character and magnitude of the asserted
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to
vindicate’ against ‘the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden
imposed by its rule,’ taking into consideration ‘the extent to which those interests make it necessary
to burden the plaintiff’s rights.’”) (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788–89).
191. See, e.g., Williams, 393 U.S. at 31 (1968) (requiring the state show a compelling interest
to protect independent candidates); Bullock, 405 U.S. at 147 (requiring a showing of necessity for
a filing fee law that would harm indigent candidates).
192. See Louis Bernard Jack, Constitutional Aspects of Financial Disclosure under the Ethics
in Government Act, 30 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 593–94 (1981) (arguing overbreadth analysis from the
First Amendment context should apply in privacy analysis).
193. See Editorial Board, ‘We the People’ Demand Mr. Trump Release His Tax Returns, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/24/opinion/we-the-people-demand-mrtrump-release-his-tax-returns.html (“Releasing the returns would provide important insight into
Mr. Trump’s finances and businesses. They would reveal if he is as wealthy as he claims to be,
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A. Slippery Slope
Resolving these open questions is important because a slippery slope is
lurking. If release laws like the one in California are found constitutional,
states will likely propose laws requiring release of many documents, such as
school transcripts or medical records.194 Like tax returns, these documents
have been relevant to the electorate in recent years and contain information
protected from public disclosure.195
School transcripts and medical records also flip the current political
valence.196 In 2012, President Trump sought President Obama’s college
applications and transcripts.197 Four years later, when running for office, he
suggested Secretary Clinton and he release their health records.198 To avoid
partisan politics in determining the constitutionality of laws that require
release of information, courts will have to ensure the state’s justifications are
properly tailored to the type of information released. Medical information,
for example, seems to burden a person’s privacy interest more than financial
information, and it is unclear what constitutionally germane or illegal
activity would be disclosed from a medical record. Law school transcripts
may inform the electorate how well a candidate did in constitutional law, but

what his effective income tax rate is (he said during the campaign that not paying taxes meant he
was smart) and how much he gives to charity.”); see, e.g., David A. Fahrenthold, Trump Promised
Millions to Charity. We Found Less Than $10,000 Over 7 Years, WASH. POST (June 28, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-promised-millions-to-charity-we-found-less-tha
n-10000-over-7-years/2016/06/28/cbab5d1a-37dd-11e6-8f7c-d4c723a2becb_story.html?utm_ter
m=.059d33106436.
194. Eric T. Tollar, Playing the Trump Card: The Perils of Encroachment Resulting from
Ballot Restrictions, 51 SUFFOLK. U. L. REV. 695, 726–27 (2018) (“However, obtaining tax returns
by way of state ballot restrictions could easily open the door to perverse results . . . We must ask
ourselves if we are willing to transform ballot restrictions from procedural roadblocks designed to
prove a candidate’s political viability, into proverbial crowbars used to pry loose information that
some simply want from a candidate. It begins with tax returns but could quickly lead to drug tests
and medical histories. Or birth certificates.”).
195. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C § 552a; 26 U.S.C. § 1232g; 45 C.F.R. § 164.524.
196. See, e.g., Russell Goldman, Donald ‘Bombshell’ Fails to Blow Up, ABC NEWS (Oct. 24,
2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/donald-trump-fails-drop-bombshell-offers-cash-oba
ma/story?id=17553670 (“Donald Trump today pledged $5 million to a charity of President
Obama’s choice, provided the president makes public his college applications and transcripts . . . .”);
Dan Merica, Clinton Campaign Releases New Health Information, CNN, (Sept. 15, 2016, 12:55
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/09/14/politics/clinton-campaign-releases-new-health-informati
on/index.html (“Hillary Clinton’s campaign released additional medical information Wednesday
after questions about her health intensified. . . .”).
197. Russell Goldman, Donald ‘Bombshell’ Fails to Blow Up, ABC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2012),
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/donald-trump-fails-drop-bombshell-offers-cash-obama/stor
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198. Dan Merica, Clinton Campaign Releases New Health Information, CNN, (Sept. 15, 2016,
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it does not seem that such information can be tailored to a more compelling
justification to require aspiring officeholders to release their grades.
Nonetheless, an ambitious state could argue medical reports and transcripts
tie into the Twenty-Fifth Amendment’s assurances that a President is able
“to discharge the powers and duties of his office.”199 Like release laws, these
questions provide no easy answers. But they demonstrate the need for courts
to ensure the interests at stake are tailored to the burdens—and for further
clarity on the definition of qualification and the states’ power in regulating
presidential elections.
IX. Conclusion
On April 15, 2017, thousands of Americans marched in protest to
demand that President Trump release his tax returns.200 Taking to the streets
has been one of many avenues used by Americans to demand access to their
President’s financial information. Another avenue offered in at least 25
states, and passed in California, requires presidential candidates to release
their tax returns in order to be placed on the state’s presidential ballot.201
Beyond the temporal politics, these laws invoke constitutional ambiguities,
including the meaning of the Qualifications Clauses, the application of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments’ protection of candidates’ access to the
ballot, the reach of the right to privacy, the significance of the Emoluments
Clauses, the breadth of power to states to conduct presidential elections, and
the role states have in policing federal corruption. The release laws provide
a vehicle to resolve urgent constitutional uncertainties that extend well
beyond today’s political fight.

199. U.S. CONST. amend. XXV.
200. Greg Allen, Protesters Use April 15 to Demand Trump’s Tax Returns, NPR (April 15,
2017), https://www.npr.org/2017/04/15/524122918/protesters-use-april-15-to-demand-trumps-ta
x-returns.
201. Alexi McCammond, The Big Picture: The State Efforts to Keep Trump off the 2020
Ballot, AXIOS (June 24, 2018), https://www.axios.com/states-tax-return-laws-presidential-2020trump-88e84cce-7214-409d-b4c7-a24aad919bdb.html.

